Xi, Putin, and Kim: The Authoritarian Axis that Aims to Challenge US Primacy

Bradley Olson

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin, China’s President Xi Jinping, and North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un attend a reception at Beijing’s Great Hall of the People after a military parade commemorating 80 years since Japan’s surrender in World War II, September 3, 2025. (Jade Gao/AFP/Getty Images)

When Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and North Korean Leader Kim Jung Un appeared side by side at the 2025 Chinese Victory Day Parade, it marked the second time in only 2 weeks that the pair of Putin and Xi had staged a coordinated show of unity, and the symbolism could not have been clearer. These appearances demonstrate an unmistakable strategic intent: three authoritarian powers, each with its own ambitions, uniting to signal that a new alignment is taking shape against the United States and its western allies.

For Washington, these increasingly frequent images should be jarring. The gathering was staged on the 80th anniversary of the Japanese surrender and the end of World War II, a deliberate move by China to frame itself as the inheritor of a righteous victory against foreign aggression and to draw parallels to its contemporary rivalry with the West. By casting their partnership as a continuation of triumph over foreign occupation, these leaders presented themselves as guardians against Western interference.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which met from August 31st to September 1st, 2025, further demonstrates China and Russia’s concerted effort to counterbalance US influence in Eurasia and the greater geopolitical landscape. It is at the juncture where both China, Russia, and North Korea's vastly different motivations all converge.

To the United States, these nations serve as destabilizers to the US led global security system. The reality that the United States must now face, is that a formidable multipolar world order is being built in real time, one in which its adversaries are cooperating and legitimizing each other on the world stage, and the US is continuously left out.

However, the enduring nature of this alliance is dubious. It is, after all, an axis of convenience, fragile but functional, united almost solely by their opposition to Washington. That recognition should not serve to undermine the risks this coalition could pose, but it should reframe policymaker's strategies towards exploiting those divides.

Even on shaky ground, the partnership provides each of the three nations with distinct benefits:

China uses the SCO to normalize regional security structures that exclude Washington and place themselves in positions of strategic preeminence. The SCO certainly does not rival NATO, but Beijing has clear intentions to construct an Asian security architecture with such capabilities, and for China, this is a step in the right direction.

Russia, who continues to hurt from sanctions and its faltering war in Ukraine, utilizes its relationship with China to showcase that it is not isolated. They rely on forums like the SCO to demonstrate that the world is indeed multipolar, and the US will not rule unchallenged.

North Korea, the smallest actor, is likely who benefits the most from such interactions, as Pyongyang’s growing international position allows for more opportunities for arms transfers and economic support from Russia, China, and other non-western-aligned nations, each of which directly threatens United States deterrence in the Indo Pacific. North Korea’s presence at the V-Day Parade also legitimizes its status as a recognized actor instead of an isolated outlier. The more Pyongyang appears on the international stage, the harder it may become for the United States to rally others around sanctions or pressure campaigns.

Furthermore, the likelihood of arms deals, technology and information exchanges, or joint exercises increases with every display of coordination between Beijing, Moscow, and Pyongyang. With US military capabilities already stretched thin, these developments could pull the United States in multiple directions at once.

Skeptics have argued that the SCO is too divided and too unwieldy to matter, but this is a mistake. Some of the most durable blocs we have ever seen began as loose forums before they evolved. While the SCO may lack the cohesion of something like NATO today, the future could tell a different story. This coalition may be laying the blueprints for a global order where US power is weakened and its adversaries coordinate against them more effectively than ever before, and Washington cannot continue to ignore such a risk. The US needs answers.

Strengthening U.S. alliances in Asia is the logical starting point. Cooperation with Japan and South Korea is valuable, but it must be expanded beyond symbolic exercises. Regularized patrols in the South and East China Seas and integrated contingency planning will ensure that any act of aggression is met with a coordinated response, linking American capabilities with those of its regional partners.

Washington must also compete more effectively in the Global South, where Beijing and Moscow are steadily filling vacuums. This requires a visible demonstration that the United States can be a reliable partner. Revitalizing USAID and fully committing to the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment would allow Washington to provide tangible alternatives that counter authoritarian influence while building long-term trust.

Deterrence, too, must evolve. Cyberattacks on allies should be treated as attacks on the United States itself. Building integrated missile defense systems alongside collective cyber defenses will raise the costs of coercion to the point where adversaries cannot achieve advantages without unacceptable risks.

The United States retains unmatched military, economic, and diplomatic capacity, but the power we refrain from using is power that is ultimately wasted. If Washington underestimates the SCO as a symbolic display of opposition against the U.S., it will find itself unprepared when more coordinated action becomes reality. Washington must be both careful and proactive in both its treatment of this emerging bloc, and its efforts to increase its own influence globally, as these key decisions will shape the global stage for the next decade. Xi, Putin, and Kim are counting on American complacency, and Washington cannot afford to give it to them.