Wake Up, Europe: Fossil Fuel Dependence in the Iran War
- Kaylin Meredith Fowler
- Apr 15
- 4 min read

President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, did not mince her words when she spoke before the European Parliament: “Ten days of war have already cost European taxpayers an additional €3 billion in fossil fuel imports. That is the price of our dependence.” This admission is striking, but it is all too familiar. Again, the European Union (EU) finds itself paying dearly for a conflict it is not directly involved in or in control of.
Despite touting political and economic weight, the EU is bogged down by its reliance on external energy sources, becoming exposed to harsh geopolitical pressure. The result is bleak for Brussels: paralyzed and unable to act, the EU absorbs the costs and condemns the crisis. The EU is vulnerable, no doubt, but the question is whether it will relearn the same lesson every time a major event happens or change its tune.
Von der Leyen’s warning is impossible to ignore. The U.S.-Israeli strike on Iran has triggered what some experts are calling the largest oil disruption in modern history, surpassing even the Suez Crisis in 1956. With the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint through which nearly 20% of global oil and gas flows, markets reacted sharply. Benchmark crude oil surged past €100 per barrel, and energy prices within Europe have jumped by nearly 50% in just two weeks.
Gas prices within the EU have also been drastically affected. Hovering around €30/MWh earlier this year, these prices are expected to surge to €45–60/MWh. Von der Leyen has also not been silent on this issue, acknowledging that gas prices have risen by 50% and oil prices by 27% since the conflict in Iran began. In Europe, the consequences of this war are immediate and severe. This is another example of Europe failing a stress test once again.
At the very core, this problem is structural. The EU remains more dependent on fossil fuel imports than almost any other major economy, importing over 90% of its oil and around 80% of its gas. However, this vulnerability is not evenly distributed throughout the Union; it affects key member states differently.
Italy, for example, remains highly dependent on gas, which is essential for powering most of its industries and households. Germany, arguably the most important member state, continues to depend on imported energy following its phase-out of nuclear power. Meanwhile, Hungary’s energy model is deeply tied to external suppliers, like Russia, limiting its bargaining power during an energy crisis.
The pivot away from Russian energy after 2022 did not resolve the EU’s vulnerability; it simply redistributed it. Now, the EU still relies on external suppliers, including the U.S. and Gulf producers, all of whom operate in the same volatile market. The exposure to geopolitical crises has not changed, and in fact, in some ways, it has worsened.
The EU entered 2026 with much lower gas storage than in recent years, just 46 bcm at the end of February 2026, compared to 60 bcm in 2025 and 77 bcm in 2024. And because the current crisis affects both LNG and oil markets simultaneously, its ripple effects extend beyond supply security to the entire structure of the EU’s energy system.
This crisis is not an isolated event. It is the third major geopolitical energy shock in Europe’s modern history: the 1973 oil crisis and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The latter alone cost the EU (and the UK) €1.8 trillion between 2022 and 2025. At the time, one analyst said that the 2022 crises: “presented a fork in the road for Europe: double down on volatile fossil fuel markets, or pivot to homegrown clean energy and greater security.”
Perhaps the most concerning aspect of this crisis is the disjointed political response emerging across the EU. Faced with rising costs, countries like Italy and Hungary are pushing leaders in Brussels to weaken the EU’s climate policies to provide relief across the Union. On the surface, this seems reasonable, but in practice, it is counterproductive. The very crises now driving energy prices upward are the clearest evidence that dependence on fossil fuels is the problem, not the solution.
The irony of this situation is hard to ignore, as countries most exposed to this price volatility are often the ones least willing to accelerate the transition away from fossil fuels. In Italy, gas prices surged from €32/MWh in February to €50/MWh on March 11th, a 56% increase due to its high dependence on gas and limited renewable energy contribution.
Meanwhile, the UN climate chief recently described calls to weaken climate policy as “completely delusional,” and that “meek dependence on fossil fuel imports will leave Europe forever lurching from crisis to crisis.” This call from inside the house shows that the EU is stuck in a cycle where it has the power but not yet the will to break.
The EU is approaching a series of critical decision points, including the April 2026 European Grids Summit and the upcoming Q3 ETS review. These summits provide the EU with an out; it can take action. The EU’s 2025 Grids Package, which aims to create a fully interconnected energy network across member states, is a direct opportunity to slash reliance on external suppliers. But this ambition will do little without the political will to put it into practice. The EU has the right idea when it comes to solutions, but they have struggled to implement them.
The Iran war didn't create Europe's vulnerability; it just made it impossible to ignore again. Whether the EU understands the problem is no longer in doubt. The question now is whether it will act upon its understanding, or whether it wants to repeat another chapter of the cycle of crisis, condemnation, and inaction. If the EU looks back at its history, it may realize it only has a few chances left to get this right.




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