The Indus Waters Treaty: India’s Weaponization of Water

Aidan Fernandes

The Indus River serves as the main stem of the three eastern and western rivers granted to India and Pakistan - Akhtar Soomro | (Via: Reuters)

Introduction

India and Pakistan have a complicated relationship, to say the least, ranging from the Partition of India in 1947 to ample disagreement over the rightful ownership of the disputed Kashmir territory. However, the Indus River is a geographical element to the Indo-Pakistani relationship that continues to cause immediate stress on the populations and governments of both states.

The Indus River, which provides a necessary water source for both states from its main river and its tributaries for agriculture and water-powered energy, consistently leaves Pakistan threatened due to India’s suspected withdrawal from the existing Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. As a result of recent events unfolding in the Kashmir region and further straining of Indo-Pakistani relations, Indian threats towards the legitimacy of the Indus Waters Treaty have begun to solidify.

On April 22nd, 2025, a deadly attack unfolded in Indian-administered Kashmir, killing 26 civilian tourists, immediately claimed by the Pakistani militant group, the “Kashmir Resistance.” As a result of this attack, India promptly suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, viewing this as a Pakistan-ordered strike on India.

With this, the complete withdrawal of India from the treaty is increasingly possible. Although this tragedy prompts understandably immediate action from India, a complete withdrawal-or even the current suspension-would certainly produce devastating damage to the Pakistani economy, negatively impact the civilian population in Pakistan, and further strain Indo-Pakistani relations.

What is the Indus Waters Treaty?

The Establishment of the Treaty

The Indus Waters Treaty is a result of the issues stemming from the Partition of India in 1947, regarding the rights of ownership of the Indus River between India and Pakistan. After the establishment of India and Pakistan as independent states, the Indus Waters Treaty allowed for a legal foundation for the sharing of ownership of the river and its tributaries to both states.

In 1960, the treaty was signed between former Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru and former President of Pakistan Mohammad Ayub Khan. The treaty was orchestrated by the World Bank, and split the Indus River and its tributaries evenly between three eastern rivers and three western rivers. India would be granted the three eastern rivers, Sutlej, Beas and Ravi, and Pakistan would be granted the three western rivers, Indus, Jhelum and Chenab.

The Indus River and Its Purpose

The Indus River provides an ample amount of support for both India and Pakistan, through its supply of water for agricultural purposes, energy through hydroelectric power plants, and general provision of water and food.

South Asia is a region that is extremely susceptible to the negative impacts of climate change, with water scarcity between India and Pakistan increasing, hence the increased dispute over river ownership. Climate change has consistently diminished the available water utilized for energy, resources, and economic opportunity over time, making it more important to prioritize stable water flow for both India and Pakistan.

India currently holds an ample amount of investment in the Indus River in the form of hydroelectric dams, such as the Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project and the Ratle Hydroelectric Plant, providing capacities of 330 megawatts and 850 megawatts, respectively. These dams, as well as current hydroelectric projects on the river are constructed and developed by India’s National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), a public-sector hydropower company responsible for hydroelectric operations for the state. 

In addition to the hydroelectric sector, India also invests heavily in the agricultural sector as a result of the Green Revolution in the 1970s, directly contributing to an increased investment in industries geared towards combating food scarcity. However, the agricultural sector is seen as less vital to the economy with the rise in economic growth rates in the services and industrial sectors.

Pakistan also invests heavily in hydroelectric power, with every one of the 21 Pakistani hydroelectric power plants situated on the Indus River. However, it invests more heavily in the agricultural sector of the state. As stated by CSIS Senior Fellow David Michel, “The sector constitutes the backbone of the economy,” providing 22.9% of the GDP and 37.4% of the jobs in the Pakistani workforce. 

The Indus River and its tributaries are responsible for sustaining 90% of Pakistan’s crops, as well as steady replenishment of Pakistani drinking water for the 90% of Pakistanis living in close proximity to the Indus River. The water from the river and its tributaries is of crucial importance to Pakistan, not just for its energy sector and economy, but for civilian welfare.

Why is the Indus River the Center of Such Conflict?

Indian Positioning

India is situated as both the upper and lower riparian state of the Indus River, meaning that it is simultaneously positioned at the river’s headwaters and its lower reaches. However, its position as the upper riparian state is exponentially more important.

Positioned as the upper riparian state, India has an abundance of autonomy when it comes to the flow of water from the river. Post-partition, both states were underdeveloped and in dire need of a reliable water source to support both of their respective economies and general welfare. In 1948, the Inter-Dominion Accord was signed to allow for India to feed Pakistan a certain amount of water downstream in exchange for a fitting payment; however, this sowed the initial seeds of mistrust between the two states regarding the river.

After the Indus Waters Treaty, this mistrust did not halt. As the upper riparian state, India has been accused on several occasions of diverting the flow of water upstream to benefit from the provision of water for hydroelectric power. Additionally, Pakistan has accused India of water stoppages to directly affect the water flow into Pakistani hydroelectric power, all to negatively impact Pakistani energy output.

There have been several disagreements between India and Pakistan regarding the establishment of the Kishanganga and Ratle hydroelectric plants, both constructed by India’s NHPC. Due to Article III, Section 4 of the Indus Waters Treaty, India is to abstain from the construction of any “storage works” with the exception of Annexure D, allowing for construction geared towards the “Generation of hydroelectric power.” However, Pakistan openly disagrees with the design of the plants, arguing that it violates this portion of the treaty permitting Pakistan to oppose Indian hydroelectric plants based on design constraints. This, however, is consistently dismissed by India as solely being another way for Pakistan to strategically hinder India’s economic efforts.

In addition to the issue of energy, the stoppage of water also has an immediate effect on the agricultural sector and large population of farmers in Pakistan. Pakistan is an agrarian economy, meaning that it is heavily reliant on land cultivation for food production and economic growth. The economy is extremely dependent on the Indus Waters Treaty, and the stoppage or diversion of water affects the flow that farmers can use for agriculture. 

As referenced in an article published by Shah Meer Baloch in The Guardian, the President of the Kissan Ittehad in Pakistan (Farmer’s Union), Khalid Khokhar, stressed the importance of the Indus River, declaring, “‘Water is our life. We can’t compromise on it.’,” and that “‘There should be no politics on water. It is our lifeline’.”

Recent Developments in Kashmir

A large catalyst for the surfacing of this issue is the Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan, which has resulted in several skirmishes in the territory, further straining the relationship between India and Pakistan.

The Kashmir conflict is the dispute between India and Pakistan regarding the ownership of the disputed territory. Its roots trace back to 1947, when Kashmir was labeled as an undecided territory, and 1949, with the ratification of Article 370 allowing Kashmir to maintain semi-autonomy. This article shattered any formal, legal claim that either India or Pakistan may have had or would go on to have in Kashmir. Regardless, both India and Pakistan claim the territory for their own and have gone to war three times in support of their claims to this territory, with the first and second Indo-Pakistani Wars in 1947 and 1965, and the Kargil War in 1999.

However, a recent development in this conflict has surfaced, with the recent attack on April 22nd, 2025, in Pahalgam, a town in Kashmir, killing 25 Hindu tourists and one local Kashmiri. This attack was carried out by a Pakistani militant group labeled the “Kashmir Resistance,” which is suspected by Indian officials to be a cover-up for the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a Pakistani militant group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks.

As a result of this attack, the Indian government immediately suspected Pakistan to be the orchestrating party. In response, India has made several detentions of people in Indian-administered Kashmir suspected to be affiliated with the attack, conducted house raids, and suspended tourism in Kashmir. However, most notably of course, to strike back at Pakistan, India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty, leaving Pakistanis and the Pakistani government in panic of what is to result of this suspension.

What Would an Indian Withdrawal Mean?

As stated before, the Indus Waters Treaty has been suspended by India, which gravely increases the possibility of a full withdrawal from the treaty.

The withdrawal of India from this treaty would have immediate effects on Pakistan, with India holding the position of the upper riparian state. India would have full control of the water flow in the main stem of the Indus River, therefore providing itself with the full capacity to strategically overflow the three western rivers granted to Pakistan, while also being able to deny Pakistan water from a crucial water source. Indian control of this river would decrease Pakistani security and negatively impact Pakistan’s economy, with potential river overflows and denial of the water necessary for its agricultural sector and domestic household uses.

Additionally, with the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, Pakistan has threatened to exit the Simla Agreement of 1972. This agreement allowed for the designation of a Line of Control (LoC), which has served as a necessary foundation for Indo-Pakistani relations regarding Kashmir. This agreement came as a result of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, signed by former Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi and former President of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, promising that both India and Pakistan would respect the LoC and completely retreat to the Kashmir ceasefire lines. It has allowed for a bilaterally binding agreement deterring either side from entering the ceasefire line.

The Simla Agreement was disobeyed by Pakistani forces in 1999, resulting in the Kargil War; ironically, this underlined the importance of the agreement. It has allowed for India and Pakistan to have somewhat of a legal foundation regarding Kashmir, pressuring both states to solve the dispute peacefully and deterring the nuclear-armed neighbors from full-scale escalation into war.

Potential Solutions

To prevent a complete withdrawal of India from the Indus Waters Treaty and the negative impacts that would ensue as a result, it is not enough anymore to simply state that increased dialogue between the two states must occur, regardless of its importance. Truly, between India and Pakistan, there are zero expectations for this to naturally take place anytime soon, due to the consistent shying away from taking accountability on both sides.

For long-term solutions to the issue of the Indus Waters Treaty and general Indo-Pakistani disputes, institutional reform and administration transitions in both governments that prioritize peaceful dialogue and development of Indo-Pakistani relations would allow for the necessary dialogue between these two states to emerge and progress towards reconciliation. 

However, an immediate solution for Pakistan is necessary due to the suspension of such a vital treaty, perhaps by appeasing India in one way or another, either verbally or by materialistic means. Either way, this may be the time that Pakistan must swallow its pride and appease India and move towards rapid negotiations for its own immediate domestic welfare.

Conclusion

The Pakistani government must take immediate action first to secure domestic welfare. A strategy of appeasement, reinforced with the potential involvement of external mediators to support Pakistan in its negotiations with India, provides the most viable route in a dire situation such as this.

Only after immediate crises are solved can India and Pakistan look toward a time of reconciliation; however, the current trajectory of persistent instability between the two states prolongs this delay.